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Security professionals utilize different types of systems, tools, and software in an 
attempt to secure an organization from external threats. There are many challenges that 
professionals face, when attempting to choose and execute a system into their 
framework.  Because of these challenges, professionals may decide to go with a free 
open source system, such as the Security Onion. However, there is little information or 
results that show the effectiveness of the system.  Several articles indicate ways of 
configuring the system or examining certain components within it.  This project aims to 
examine the effectiveness of the Security Onion through a controlled test. The results of 
this project help inform professionals of the effectiveness and provide a baseline for 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Introduction 
This work takes a closer look into the functionality and efficiency of a prebuilt, 
open source, security tool, known as the Security Onion. The Security Onion was 
selected as the system of choice for this experiment based on the numerous different 
kinds of tools that are integrated into its design. Many security systems don’t 
incorporate numerous tools into the design, making it a unique system to analyze. The 
experiment will be conducted using two different computers.  The first computer will be 
a baseline device, that won’t have Security Onion installed onto it.  The second device 
will have the Security Onion installed and running on the machine.  Each of these 
machines will have the same kinds of attacks performed on them. The outcomes of 
each attack will be tracked and documented. The results, from the attacks, will then be 
used in a comparative analysis to determine the effectiveness of the Security Onion. 
The findings from the project will then be concluded, and future work will be addressed.  
Problem Statement     
Security and network professionals are tasked with securing an enterprises 
network and resources. However, many organizations fail to provide them with the 
necessary budget, guidance, or resources. Therefore, these professionals decided to 
use opensource tools, like the Security Onion, to secure their network; without fully 
understanding the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the tool. Thus, this work aims to 
examine the efficiency of the security tool. It will utilize a variety of software, to launch a 
series of distributed of denial, or DoS attacks, against it. DoS attacks are used by an 
attacker to flood a device’s system, which can make it unable the user depending on the 
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magnitude of the attack.  These attacks will then be documented, examined, and 
evaluated to provide professionals with further insight.    
Nature and Significance of the Problem  
Monitoring and securing a network is a daunting task, as new threats evolve and 
attack daily. Several security tools, such as the Security Onion, have been created to 
help users identify and protect their networks. However, the question is how efficient or 
effective are these tools? Users and professionals install them with the expectation that 
they will identify and alert them to significant problems or issues. Although these tools 
aren’t a cure-all.  The users of these tools need to be aware of the true effectiveness 
and realize that their system may not be as secure as they believe it to be.  Also, that 
their networks and systems may require more attention and monitoring than just simply 
installing a security tool and expecting it do the work. 
Objectives of the Research   
The objective of this research is to provide a comparative analysis of a device 
with the Security Onion installed, and one without it.  It is to provide users with greater 
insight into how effective or ineffective a security tool may actually be. This could 
potentially help them realize, or understand, the pros and cons of a security tool and 
how secure their network truly is.  
Research Questions   
There are several research questions addressed in the project.  The first is how 
complex it is it to install and utilize the Security Onion? The second is how efficient is 
the Security Onion at monitoring and securing a network? The third is what should 
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security and network professionals understand about using the Security Onion as an 
alert tool? The last question is how does the Security Onion withstand DoS attacks? 
Limitations of the Research 
This study is limited to the comparative analysis of the Security Onion, although, 
there are other opensource security tools available for enterprises to utilize.  Moreover, 
this work attempts to launch attacks on each computer to analyze the effects.  However, 
the complexity of the attacks is restricted, and doesn’t include all variations of 
protentional threats or vulnerabilities.     
Definition of Terms 
Security Onion: is “a free and open source Linux distribution for intrusion 
detection, enterprise security monitoring, and log management. It includes 
Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana, Snort, Suricata, Bro, OSSEC, Sguil, Squert, 
NetworkMiner, and many other security tools” (“Security Onion,” n.d.). 
Elasticsearch: is “an open source distributed, RESTful search and analytics 
engine capable of solving a growing number of use cases” (“Elasticsearch,” n.d). 
Logstash: is “an open source, server-side data processing pipeline that ingests 
data from a multitude of sources simultaneously, transforms it, and then sends it to your 
favorite stash” (“Logstash,” n.d.).  
Kibana: is a software that allows users to manipulate their data through differing 
interactive visualizations.  This would include “histograms, line graphs, pie charts, 
sunbursts, and more” (“Kibana”, n.d.). It is easy to use and conveniently lets users 
share their results (“Kibana,” n.d.).   
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Snort: is “an open source intrusion prevention system capable of real-time traffic 
analysis and packet logging” (“Snort,” n.d.). 
Suricata: “is a free and open source, mature, fast and robust network threat 
detection engine” (“Suricata,” n.d.).   
Bro: is considered to be a network security monitor, that is adaptable, efficient, 
highly stateful, flexible, and open source.  It provides in-depth analysis, along with 
forensic and open interface capabilities” (“The Bro,” n.d.). 
Open Source Host-based Intrusion Detection System (OSSEC): “is a 
scalable, multi-platform, open source Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS). It 
has a powerful correlation and analysis engine, integrating log analysis, file integrity 
checking, Windows registry monitoring, centralized policy enforcement, rootkit 
detection, real-time alerting and active response” (“OSSEC,” n.d.).   
Sguil: is a software that is designed for network security analysts.  It was 
designed to with a graphical user interface (GUI), “that provides access to realtime 
events, session data, and raw packet captures” (Visscher et al., n.d.).  
Squert: “is a web application that is used to query, and view event data stored in 
a Sguil database (typically IDS alert data).” “It attempts to provide additional context to 
events through the use of metadata, time series representations and weighted and 
logically grouped result sets” (“The Squertproject,” n.d.). 
NetworkMiner: “is an open source Network Forensic Analysis Tool (NFAT) for 
Windows.”  It “can be used as a passive network sniffer/packet capturing tool . . . to 
detect operating systems, sessions, hostnames, open ports etc. without putting any 
traffic on the network” (“NetworkMiner,” 2018).  
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Device A: The baseline computer used in this study, which doesn’t possess the 
installation of the Security Onion. 
Device B: The comparative computer used in this study, which has the Security 
Onion installed and running on the device.  
Device C: The neutral computer used to launch attacks and document the 
results. 
Network: A collection of computers that are connected to one another through 
cables or wirelessly. It allows computers to quickly communicate with one another and 
share resources, through an established IP connection.   
Artificial Intelligence (AI): devices that are capable of simulating the thought 
and learning process of humans, without continuous alterations or modifications.  
Graphical User Interface (GUI): a user-friendly way in which an average person 
can interact with a computer. The user interfaces are often created by utilizing different 
lines, shapes, colors, text, and pointing devices (Levy, 2018).  
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): NIST is a division 
within the U.S. Department of Commerce. It was established in the year 1901 and has 
evolved “to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing 
measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic 
security and improve our quality of life” (Hernandez, 2018). 
hping3: hping3 is a network tool that can be used to test perform a variety of 




This research aims to provide professionals with a clear insight into how effective 
or ineffective a security tool, such as the Security Onion, may be. The test performed, 
using the Security Onion, outlines the results and conducts a comparative analysis to 
identify the effectiveness. It attempts to help inform professionals as to how secure their 




Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature 
Introduction 
This section provides additional content relating to the background of the 
problem; including the primary use of the Security Onion to protect an enterprise’s 
network. It introduces the common problems or challenges that exist in the security 
world and the ways in which it impacts a professional’s decisions to use an open source 
system, such as the Security Onion.  It looks at literature to indicate the current 
understanding of the system and identify what’s missing. Finally, it introduces the 
concept of a private network and different types of attacks.    
Background Related to the Problem 
The area of cybersecurity has become a growing commodity for companies over 
the last decades.  Organizations are starting to realize the significance of having a 
strong security team. However, the rapid growth in this field has led to numerous 
difficulties. The first being the lack of professionals within the industry. According to Jeff 
there will be a “2 million global shortage of cybersecurity professionals by 2019“ 
(Kauflin, 2017).  This is contributing to the increasing demand within the field and the 
lack of skilled employees. A study shown in a Silence report stated that “84% [of] 
organizations believe half or fewer of applicants for open security jobs are qualified” 
(“Addressing,” n.d.). 
Another difficulty related to cybersecurity is the costs or funding required to run 
the department. In order to have a secured enterprise, organizations have to provide a 
proper amount of funding.  This is often problematic, since top managers will distribute 
the funds without fully understanding the complexity and needs of this portion of the 
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company. This type of funding is used for employees, hardware, software, trainings, 
security tools, and recovery budgets. For instance, according to Barkly, “[i]t’s predicted 
that by 2021, cybercrime will cost the world $6 trillion annually” (The Barkly Team, 
2018). In addition, “[r]ansomware damage costs alone are on track to hit $11.5 billion in 
2019, at which point it’s estimated that a business will fall victim to a ransomware attack 
every 14 seconds” (The Barkly Team, 2018). 
This leads into the next major difficulty, referring to the growing number of 
cyberattacks. Although, it is often quite hard to identify the true number of attacks that 
occur each year, a “Cyber Incident & Breach Trends Report,” by Online Trust Alliance 
(OTA), indicates that “cyber incidents nearly doubled to 159,700 globally” (Wilbur, 
2018).  However, it has been projected that the number of cyber incidents could 
possibly surpass 350,000 instances, with this number expected to further increase each 
year. Although these statistics only include the following areas: “ransomware, business 
email compromise (BEC), distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and connected 
devices vulnerability” (Wilbur, 2018).  This is limiting the number of actual attacks that 
may occur each year by a significant amount.  
Moreover, the increase in the number of attacks has also become more severe 
as hackers are starting to incorporate a variety of tactics into a single attack.  This is 
allowing them to penetrate more networks and gain assess.  In addition, these attacks 
are becoming more destructive in nature and in the instance of ransomware, even more 
expensive.  These attacks are expected to only become worse as attackers learn new 
tactics and start to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) into their strategies (Vizard, 2018). 
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These three difficulties (professionals, costs/funding, and increase in attacks) are 
why tools, like the Security Onion, are being implemented into enterprises. The Security 
Onion is a free and open source software that can be downloaded and used by any 
potential user.  It is created to provided “intrusion detection, enterprise security 
monitoring, and log management” (“Security Onion,” n.d.). It has been built to include 
the following tools: “Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana, Snort, Suricata, Bro, OSSEC, 
Sguil, Squert, NetworkMiner” and etc. (“Security Onion,” n.d.). It is designed to monitor 
alert data, asset data, full content data, host data, session data, and transaction data. 
All while utilizing a graphical user interface, for easy use.  
The Security Onion allows enterprises to automate and control the security 
process, which can potentially help a department that is lacking proper man and women 
power. In addition, it is a cost-effective solution since the software is prebuilt and free. 
Furthermore, the software is comprised of numerous security tools.  These tools are 
designed to work together to help create a more secure network (Vizard, 2018). 
On the surface the Security Onion looks like a promising tool that could solve all 
of an organization’s security problems. However, professionals need to be subjective 
when deciding on the proper way to secure their company.  Just because a software 
looks promising by description doesn’t mean that it will be the only tool required for 
security. Tools that provide automation also need a form of manual work to make it 
more effective. This is why professionals need to question the security measures they 
choose and analyze their true effectiveness. 
If security professionals fail to analyze their security tools and identify their true 
effectiveness, they may be putting their organization in harm’s way. This is due to 
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exposing the company to vulnerabilities and threats, which they believe they are safe 
from. Nevertheless, this is a continuous effort as new attacks evolve, and new tactics 
are incorporated into their design. Thus, finding new ways to penetrate an 
organization’s system and wreak havoc are a constant threat.  
Literature Related to the Problem 
The Security Onion is a relatively new concept in the cybersecurity world. When 
reading through different articles, books and journals, there seems to be a lack of 
information relating to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the software. There were 
many pieces of literature relating to the setup of the system and different ways of 
configuring it to help prevent certain types of attacks. 
The paper “Intrusion Detection System and Intrusion Prevention System with 
Snort provided by Security Onion,” by Bezborodov Sergey, analyzes the utilization of 
Snort with and without the Security Onion. It walks through the installation and 
configuration of the Security Onion, with Snort. It also addresses the setup of Snort on 
its own. It then compares the two to identify the advantages and disadvantages 
between using Snort as part of the Security Onion, or as its own individual software 
(Sergey, 2018).  
There were several advantages outlined within the paper. First, the integrated 
version of the Security Onion and Snort allows for flexibility as users can alter settings 
and configurations to their personal needs. Second, the integrated version comes 
preconfigured, for easy use.  Third, when looking at the use and installation of Snort, 
without the Security Onion, it incorporates a more in-depth analyzation of data. It takes 
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more time to configure the software but allows the user to view all packets and scripts 
(Sergey, 2016).    
Moreover, there were several disadvantages identified. First, the integrated 
version of the Security Onion and Snort isn’t configured to work as an intrusion 
prevention system (IPS) it was built to utilize intrusion detection system (IDS). Second, 
the integrated version creates complications for setting up the network. If the user wants 
to use Wi-fi, they have to set it up manually, without the use of the Wizard installation. 
Third, the integrated version was created without full backups, thus, the user must 
utilize another software. Fourth, the use of Snort on its own, without the Security Onion, 
requires a specific level of expertise. The user must have proper knowledge of Linux, to 
effectively configure and build different rules to execute in the software (Sergey, 2016).    
Furthermore, another paper highlighting the use of the Security Onion is “Logging 
and Monitoring to Detect Network Intrusions and Compliance Violations in the 
Environment,” by Gupta Sunil. It introduces the concept of security within organizations, 
of all sizes, and the challenges of meeting “the operational, audit and security needs.” 
(Sunil, 2012). The paper walks through the different software that is incorporated into 
the Security Onion system.  It then shows how to utilize the different software “to build a 
system that combines Network Based Intrusion Detection with Log Based Intrusion 
Detection to create a comprehensive security monitoring platform” (Sunil, 2012). 
The paper breaks the installation of the Security Onion system into several main 
categories. The first deals with configuring the OSSEC through specific rules, to act as 
a log collector. The second is the configuration of “NIDS Sguil/Snort sensor[s]” and 
“LIDS Sguil/Snort sensor[s]” through different rules (Sunil, 2012). Third is configuration 
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of the Sguil server through different file setups. Fourth pertains to “log analysis and 
correlation”, which is setup through “event analysis”, “database query”, “event 
correlation”, and “auto categorization” (Sunil, 2012). This allows for the alerts to be 
collected and examined to determine their severity. The alerts are then stored in a 
database, along with the different logging of activities. The stored data can then be 
reanalyzed and further examined to help pinpoint trends in the system and identify were 
an attack, or significant event, may have occurred (Sunil, 2012). 
Fifth is “log alerting and reporting”, which relates to “alert classification and 
prioritization”, “email alerts”, “Sguil reporting” and “Snorby reporting” (Sunil, 2012). The 
“alerts classification and prioritization” are done with current data. It utilizes rules to 
identify the severity of the of the attack. Depending on how the attack is identified and 
stored in the system, different alerts are sent to the user.  The email alerts are then 
created and sent by the different software within the Security Onion System, including: 
Sguil, OSSEC and Snorby. Furthermore, the Sguil report provides a basic plain text 
report for the user, providing the bare minimum. Meanwhile, the Snorby report is 
integrated with a GUI to provide a more user-friendly report.  The paper’s focus is on 
how the Security Onion can be configured and used to meet an organization’s needs.  
However, it once again fails to show the results of these configurations. It blinds 
professionals from looking at the use of the system from all angles. It focuses only on 
the positive, without any true representation of any faults.  However, the system may be 
a strong candidate that servers the user’s need, but without any representation of this 
data, how does the user know the true effectiveness of the system (Sunil, 2012)? 
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Nevertheless, another paper titled “Information Security Case Study with Security 
Onion at Kajaani UAS Datacentre Laboratory,” by Raimo Heikkinen, analyzes the use of 
the Security Onion compared to a NIST guideline. The following is the intrusion 
detection and prevention system standard, provided by NIST: 
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring the events occurring in a 
computer system or network and analyzing them for signs of possible incidents, 
which are violations or imminent threats of violation of computer security policies, 
acceptable use policies, or standard security practices. An intrusion detection 
system (IDS) is software that automates the intrusion detection process. An 
intrusion prevention system (IPS) is software that has all the capabilities of an 
intrusion detection system and can also attempt to stop possible incidents. IDS 
and IPS technologies offer many of the same capabilities, and administrators can 
usually disable prevention features in IPS products, causing them to function as 
IDSs. (“Intrusion,” n.d.) 
The Security Onion was then downloaded and utilized to identify whether or not it 
met these standards.  The project concluded that the Security Onion is capable of 
monitoring through a GUI interface (Heikkinen, 2018). It collects data from alerts, stores 
full packet capture, and tracks different trends. It is categorized as an IDS system, that 
uses the trends and events stored to create reports and alert the user. This is often 
done through several different types of email alerts that can be setup through 
configuration. Thus, it meets the requirements of the NIST guidelines. However, the 
paper also concluded that it improved the security of the system, by running it on top of 
already functioning security tools.  Along with the fact that the Security Onion requires a 
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combination of automation and manual labor. Professionals must be willing to analyze 
and review the outputs of the system on a regular basis to provide effective results 
(Heikkinen, 2018).    
Fundamentals of a Network 
In order to understand the concept of a private network, one must first have a 
proper understanding of what a network is. As stated in the definition portion of the 
paper, a network is a collection of computers that are connected to one another through 
cables or wirelessly. It allows computers to quickly communicate with one another and 
share resources, through an established IP connection.  There are many different types 
of networks including the following: Local Area Network (LAN), Wide Area Network 
(WAN), Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), Metropolitan Area Network (MAN), 
Storage Area Network (SAN), Campus Area Network (CAN), and Personal Area 
Network (PAN). These are just a few of the more popular types of networks.  They vary 
depending on the build of the connection, referring to cables or wireless.  In addition to 
the radius of the signal that it distributed to its users. However, the two most popular 










The framework of a network is comprised of three main parts: a router, a modem, 
and a switch, this is shown in Figure 2.1. The best way to look at the figure is from left to 
right. The average person has multiple devices that connect to a network, whether that 
be a phone, printer, computer, laptop, cellphone or etc. In order for them to connect to 
the network each of these devices are assigned a unique identifier, often referred to as 
an IP address.  The IP addresses are assigned by a router. A router continuously 
searches for devices to provide a connection.  This can be done either wirelessly or 
through an ethernet cable (“IP Addressing,” 2010). 
The router is then connected to a modem. This is often provided by an outside 
company, such as Charter Spectrum, Comcast Xfinity, Cox Communications, Frontier 
Communications, Mediacom, etc. It provides the router with a connection to the internet. 
Furthermore, between the internet and the router there is usually a firewall, which helps 
prevent unwanted traffic from the internet (“Networking Basics,” n.d.).  
The combination of these devices is what creates a network for them to 
communicate on.  The router allows the devices to connect and communicate with one 
another.  Meanwhile, the switch is integrated into the router, identifying the different 
communications among the devices.  It functions as a stoplight, directing the proper 
traffic to and from the correct device.  This is a basic understanding of how a general 
homebased network connection would be setup.  
Private Network 
Private networks can be useful, when a user doesn’t want their IP address to be 
publicly displayed. Or, when they just want to communicate among devices that are on 
the same physical network. It allows a user to protect and contain the information being 
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sent between the private connection, without requiring an internet connection. The 
actual configuration and setup of a network will be further elaborated on in the 
methodology chapter.  
Types of Attacks 
There are numerous types of attacks that are launched at devices daily, in an 
attempt to penetrate a system.  Each of these attacks are created for a unique purpose 
and can cause a vast variety of symptoms.  This could be anything ranging from DDoS 
to ransomware to a phishing email. Depending on the creator’s knowledge base and 
expertise, these attacks may be generated from scratch, by reusing code, or they could 
be launched using a software.  There are different types of software that can be 
downloaded and used to project these attacks, they are commonly known as 
penetration testing frameworks. They are created to help people and organizations test 
the security of their structure.  One major platform that is commonly installed and used 
is known as Kali Linux. It possesses a wide variety of tools, including: information 
gathering, vulnerability analysis, exploitation attacks, wireless attacks, forensic tools, 
web applications, stress testing, sniffing and spoofing, password attacks maintaining 
access, hardware hacking, reverse engineering, and reporting tools (“Kali,” n.d.).   
One of the primary tools utilized in the project is hping3. It is a tool that is built 
into the Kali Linux platform. Although it is a free opensource tool that anyone can 
download. It is designed with a TCL language that allows it to be integrated into a 
device’s terminal. Numerous types of attacks can be launched with this tool pertaining 
to items such as firewalls, routing protocols, and TCP/IP (“Hping,” n.d.). For this work, 
the tool will be used to flood a system and create a DoS attack.  
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Denial of service (DoS) or distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks are 
extremely popular and fairly easy to conduct. A DoS attack is “an attack which the 
attacker or attackers make an effort to make a service or resource out of access” 
(“Analysis,” 2017).  Meanwhile, a DDoS is a more secure way of performing the attack, 
while remaining undetected. There are numerous kinds of DoS/DDoS attacks, including: 
flooding attacks and logical attacks. Flooding attacks could be a SYN flood, UDP flood, 
ICMP flood, ARP flood, Xmas tree or a Rest flood. Logical attacks could be a ping of 
death, teardrop attack, or a land attack (Dzurenda et al., 2015). 
Summary 
This chapter has outlined the main challenges that have led professionals to use 
free software, tools, and systems, such as the Security Onion.  It examined previous 
research to illustrate what is known about the Security Onion and what is yet to be 
discovered.  Thus, showing that the general information provided on the system focuses 
primarily on configuration. However, it fails to truly examine the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of the system.  It merely portrays the Security Onion as a cure-all for 




Chapter III: Methodology 
Introduction 
 This section focuses on the process and steps that are used to conduct the 
project. It outlines the configuration of the Security Onion and the setup of the baseline 
computer.  It will then walk through the different attacks that are to be launched, at the 
two machines, to track and analyze the results.   
Design of the Research 
This research is intended to evaluate the Security Onion system and show its 
response to three different kinds of denial of service or DoS attacks. It is to provide 
valuable insight into the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the system, in an attempt to 
help inform security professionals. The project is conducted using two primary devices.  
Device A will be the baseline computer, while Device B will be the altered unit that 
possesses the Security Onion system. A third device, referred to as Device C, will then 
be used to launch different attacks at the two devices, and document their responses.  
Setting up the devices. This project utilizes VirtualBox to setup the different 
devices that will be used in the experiment. It can be downloaded from the following 
URL address https://www.virtualbox.org/wiki/Downloads. There are different versions 
and types that can be downloaded depending on the user’s operating system. Devices 
A will be configured to Ubuntu 16.04.03 desktop version. After downloading, installing, 












Figure 3.1. VirtualBox Main Screen 
The devices used in this project are then setup with VirtualBox. Device A is 
configured with an Ubuntu 16.04.3 desktop version disk image file. The download for 
this disk image file can be found at the following URL address 
https://www.ubuntu.com/download/alternative-downloads. After creating a new machine 
and walking through the configuration process, the main screen for the Device A should 
resemble Figure 3.2, which is shown below.  
Device B is then created within VirtualBox and is configured with the Security 
Onion 16.04.05.2 disk image file.  The disk image file can be found at the following URL 
address https://github.com/Security-Onion-Solutions/security-
onion/blob/master/Verify_ISO.md. Once the virtual machine has been created and the 
disk image has been uploaded the desktop for the Security Onion will look like Figure 





















Figure 3.3. Security Onion Desktop 
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Device C is the last device that needs to be created in VirtualBox.  It will be 
configured with a Kali Linux 2018.3 disk image file, which can be found at the following 
URL address https://www.kali.org/downloads/. The main desktop screen for this device 










Figure 3.4. Kali Linux Desktop  
Each of these machines were configured in VirtualBox differently depending on 
the different disk image requirements. Thus, some have more RAM, CPUs, and 
memory designated to them.  After setting up the machines, an internal network was 
created to contain the DoS attacks.  
Establishing a private network. Creating a private or internal network is an 
important part of this experiment. It ensures that the attacks being launched between 
the machines will be contained and not ejected at an external IP address. The act of 
launching attacks at an IP address, in which permission hasn’t been granted, is illegal.       
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The first step in creating an internal network is through the settings found within 
VirtualBox. In order to do this, the selected virtual machine must be in a Powered Off 
state.  The status of the machine will appear just below the name of the machine.  If the 
machine is running, it needs to be powered off.  If the machine is in a Saved state, it will 
need to be powered on and then powered off. After checking the state of the machine, it 
should be selected and will appear highlighted in a blue color compared to the other 
machines in the list. From there the Settings button, on the top of the screen, is selected 










Figure 3.5. VirtualBox Settings 
Next, the Network tab is selected on the right-hand side, which then displays the 
different network adapters that are available. For each of the devices the Attached to: is 
switched from NAT to Internal Network.  In this experiment, a Thesis internal network 












Figure 3.6. VirtualBox Network Settings 
The changing of the network settings is done for Device A, Device B, and Device 
C. It is the first step in creating the internal network required for this experiment.  Once 
the devices have all been configured properly in VirtualBox, each machine is booted, 
and the IP addresses are setup manually within each machine’s network settings.   
The proper way of configuring an IP address depends on the number of devices 
that are going to connected to the network.  There are universal guidelines and rules for 
IP addresses that break them into different classes, as shown below in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1. IP Address Classes (“What is,” 2018) 
Class Address Range Supports 
Class A 1.0.0.1 to 126.255.255.254 
Supports 16 million hosts on each of 127 
networks 
Class B 128.1.0.1 to 191.255.255.254 
Supports 65,000 hosts on each of 16,000 
networks 
Class C 192.0.1.1 to 223.255.254.254 
Supports 254 hosts on each of 2 million 
networks 
Class D 224.0.0.0 to 239.255.255.255 Reserved for multicast groups 
Class E 240.0.0.0 to 254.255.255.254 




Out of these classes, Class A, Class B, and Class C are the ones that are 
primarily utilized (“What is,” 2018). They each have corresponding subnets, depending 
on the class, which is shown below in Figure 3.7. 
 
Figure 3.7. Subnet Masks 
The different classes and subnets provide the general information required to 
configure each of the networks within the machine. However, RFC 1918 identities 
specific address ranges that have been created for private networks (Rouse, n.d.). Each 
address then falls into a previously identified classes and will correspond to one the 
subnets. These IP addresses can be found below in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Private Network Addresses (Soskinsky, 2001) 
Class Address Range Prefix 
Class A 10.0.0.0 – 10.255.255.255 10/8 prefix 
Class B 172.16.0.0 – 172.31.255.255 172.16/12 prefix 
Class B 192.168.0.0 – 192.168.255.255 192.168/16 prefix 
In this project, a private ten IP address is applied to the network settings for each 
device. The IP addresses increment by one for each of the devices, to ensure that there 
aren’t any overlapping connections. Then the proper corresponding subnet is used, and 
the gateway is applied. The private addresses that are used are universal and can be 
Class A Subnet Mask
Class B Subnet Mask










used by any person or organization.  Since they are built to be maintained in the intranet 
connection created between the devices on that specific router (“IP Addressing,” 2010). 
The configuration of the IP addresses is then tested in the terminal of each of the 
virtual machines. This is done by opening a terminal window, which is a different 
process for each of the machines. Once the terminal in open, the following command is 
executed to switch to a root user: 
sudo -i 
After executing the command, the terminal prompts the user for their Ubuntu 
administrative/root password.  Once the proper password has been entered, it will 
process the command and change the user to root. From there, the following command 
is entered to display the machines network configurations: 
ifconfig 
These commands can be executed on Device A, Device B, and Device C, in the 
proper terminal, since all the virtual machines are Linux based. Below, Figure 3.8 shows 
the results of these commands ran in Device A’s Terminal. It indicates that there are two 
network connections currently setup on the Ubuntu device. The first interface is enp0s3 
and the second is lo. For the purpose of this experiment, enp0s3 will be the network of 
focus. It becomes evident that the enp0s3 network is an ethernet connection.  In 
addition, the IP address for the network connection is 10.10.0.10 and the subnet mask 
is 255.0.0.0. Running this command in the terminal ensures that the configurations 
made in the network settings, on the device, have been executed and saved properly to 
the system.   
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Figure 3.8. Ubuntu Terminal IP 
For Device B, the same commands were ran in the Security Onion’s terminal. 
Figure 3.9 (below) shows the results that were displayed. The output in the Security 
Onion terminal include numerous network interfaces and their configurations.  However, 
enp0s8 is the primary interface that is used in this project. Thus, Figure 3.9 only 
displays a small snippet of all of the outputs. From the outputs it is easy to conclude that 
he IP address assigned to the network interface is 10.10.0.11 and the subnet mask is 




Figure 3.9. Security Onion Terminal IP 
Lastly, the commands were ran in Device C’s terminal.  The following figure, 
Figure 3.10, shows the results that were displayed on the Kali Linux machine. Like 
Device A, this machine only had two network interfaces, eth0 and lo. The eth0 network 
interface is that network of focus.  It is an ethernet connect, the same as Device A and 
Device B. The network interface has an IP address of 10.10.0.13 and its subnet mask is 
255.0.0.0.  
Figure 3.10. Kali Linux Terminal IP 
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Now that the internal networks have been configured and checked in the 
terminals, they need to be tested to determine whether or not they can communicate 
with one another over the internal network.  
Ping test. Ping test is required to test the connection.  If there isn’t a proper 
connection formed between the devices, they will be unable to communicate, making it 
impossible to conduct the experiment. Device C, or the Kali Linux device is going to be 
the device used to launch the attacks.  Thus, it will be the device used to test the 
connections between itself and the other two devices.  
A ping test is conducted in the terminal of the machine. It requires the knowledge 
of another devices IP address to test the connection. The command executed in the 
terminal resembles the following format: 
ping xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx 
In the above ping format, the x’s represent the IP address of the device that is to 
be contacted. In the previous section the IP addresses were defined for each of the 
devices; a summary of this information can be show below in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3. Device A, B, & C Networks 
First, the connection between Device A and Device C is tested. In Device C’s 
terminal the following command is executed: 
ping 10.10.0.10 
Device Network Interface IP Address 
Device A enp0s3 10.10.0.10 
Device B enp0s8 10.10.0.11 
Device C eth0 10.10.0.13 
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Figure 3.11 (below) illustrates the results of the command, as shown in the Kali Linux 
terminal.  
Figure 3.11. Ping Test Device A 
From Figure 3.11 it can be concluded that Device C (Kali Linux) was able to 
communicate with Device A (Ubuntu) over the internal network. This becomes evident 
as six packets were sent by Device C, and six packets were received by Device A 
without any packet loss or error messages.  
The ping test then needs to be conducted one more time to test the connection 
between Device B and Device C. However, this time the command executed in Device 
C’s terminal is a bit different, as show below: 
ping 10.10.0.11 
The results gathered from executing this command can be found below in Figure 
3.12. It illustrates the outcome of the ping test on Device B (Security Onion). Where 
Device C (Kali Linux) sent four packets to Device B, which were successfully received. 




Figure 3.12. Ping Test Device B 
Security Onion. After the three devices have been configured to a private 
network and the connections have been tested with a ping test, Device B will be setup 
with the Security Onion System. The deployment of the Security Onion system will 
follow the setup and configuration steps found in the book “The Practice of Network 
Security Monitoring” by Richard Bejtlich. The following steps will be taken to equip 
Device B with the Security Onion system. 
In the previous sections the Security Onion disk image file was downloaded from 
the GitHub webpage and was loaded into a virtual machine. When booting the Security 
Onion machine from VirtualBox it will prompt the system to boot as a live system, which 
will display a GUI (Bejtlich, 2013). To start the setup of the system, the Setup icon 
















Figure 3.13. Security Onion: Setup 
After selecting the Setup icon, the user is prompted with a screen that requests a 
password. The password used for this step would have been setup during the initial 
configuration of the system when it was uploaded into the VirtualBox machine. The 
password is then entered into the box and the OK button is selected (Bejtlich, 2013).  
This step can be seen below in Figure 3.14. 
Figure 3.14. Security Onion: Password 
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Once the OK button has been selected the next screen welcomes the user to 
configure a list of services.  The Yes, Continue! button is selected to start the 
configuration process. This screen can be viewed in Figure 3.15, which is displayed 
below. The box that appears on the screen asks the user if they would like to configure 
the network interfaces. The Yes, configure /etc/network/ingerfactes! button is selected 
to advance to the next step. The network interfaces step is illustrated below in Figure 
3.16. 
The next step in the process is to identify which network interface will be used for 
the management interface. When setting up the virtual machine in VirtualBox there were 
two network adapters assigned the Security Onion machine. These adapters were 
automatically assigned a name, one is enp0s3 and the other is enp0s8. They can be 
viewed, below, in Figure 3.17, where the management interface needs to be identified. 
In this project enp0s3 was selected to serve as the network management interface and 









Figure 3.15. Security Onion: Welcome Screen 
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Figure 3.17. Security Onion: Management Interface 
After selecting the management network interface, the next step is to decide 
whether or not the addressing will be static or DHCP. In this project DHCP is selected 
for the addressing type and OK will be selected to continue.  This step is shown below 




Figure 3.18. Security Onion: Static Addressing 
  Now that the management network interface has been selected and a DHCP 
type has been assigned. The next screen will ask the user if they’d like to configure a 
sniffing interface (Bejtlich, 2013). The Yes, configure sniffing interface. is selected, 
which can be viewed below in Figure 3.19. 
Figure 3.19. Security Onion: Sniffing Interfaces 
The next step is to identify which interface will be used for the sniffing interface.  
When configuring the management interface, the enpo0s3 was assigned to be the 
interfaced used. This leaves enp0s8 to be setup as the sniffing network interface.  This 








Figure 3.20. Security Onion: Selecting Sniffing Interface 
After selecting the OK button, a screen is displayed showing the changes that 
were made in the last few steps. It asks the user if they would like to make the changes. 
The Yes, make changes! button is selected, which is shown blow in Figure 3.21. 
Figure 3.21. Security Onion: Verify Network Changes 
This will complete the network configuration part of the setup. In which case the 
next screen displayed will ask the user to reboot before continuing on with the second 
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part of the setup process. The Yes, reboot! button is selected, as shown below in Figure 
3.22. The virtual machine will then reboot.   
After the reboot has finished the Setup icon on the desktop is selected to finish 
the setup process.  The same screen, which was shown above, in Figure 3.15, will be 
displayed.  At which point the Yes, Continue! button is selected. The next screen will 
ask the user if they would like to reconfigure the network or skip it. Since, it was already 
configured in the previous steps, the Yes, skip network configuration! is clicked, as 
shown below in Figure 3.23. 
Figure 3.22. Security Onion: System Reboot 
Figure 3.23. Security Onion: Reconfigure Network 
The next step is to determine what kind of mode will be used. There are two 
choices: evaluation mode and production mode. Since this machine will never be used 
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in a production deployment environment, the Evaluation Mode is selected, and the OK 








Figure 3.24. Security Onion: Mode Selection 
 Once the OK button has been selected, the user will be asked what interfaces 
should be monitored. The network interface that is of primary focus in this project is 
enp0s8.  This interface should be selected, and the OK button should be pushed 









Figure 3.25. Security Onion: Monitor Interface 
After selecting the monitor interface, the setup process will ask the user to create 
an account for accessing Kibana, Squert, and Sguil. It will first ask the user to create a 
username, as shown below in Figure 3.26. 
Figure 3.26 Security Onion: Username 
 Once a username has been selected, a password is created to setup the 
account.  A password will need to be entered and then entered again to verify that they 














Figure 3.28 Security Onion: Confirm Password 
When the requirements for the username and password have been completed, 
the next screen will ask the user if they are okay with the changes that are about to be 
made.  The following Figure 3.29 shows this step.  The Yes, proceed with the changes! 
is then selected to implement them. This will then start the processing of the setup, 
which takes a few minutes to complete.  Once the setup has finished a series of boxes 
will appear, one after another, as the user clicks OK to proceed to the next one. These 
boxes indicate: where system logs are stored, where IDS alerts can be viewed, where 











Figure 3.29. Security Onion: Implement Changes 
This completes the configuration of the Security Onion system for the use of this 
project.  Showing the baseline for how the system was configured can provide others 
with the proper knowledge to understand the results of the experiment. 
 DoS attacks. Device A, Device B and Device C have been setup with a private 
network. In addition, Device B has been equipped with the Security Onion system. The 
next step in the methodology is to identify the attacks that will be launch at Device A, 
the baseline device, and Device B, the Security Onion device. 
 Device C will be used to launch the attacks at Device A and Device B, it is 
configured with Kali Linux, which is configured with numerous tools that can be used for 
penetration testing.  In this project, the hping security tool will be utilized to test the 
efficiency of the system against three different kinds of DoS attacks. These attacks are 
ran in the Kali Linux Terminal as an executable command.  
 The first attack is a UDP DoS flood attack. The following is the format of the 
command that is used to execute the attack: 
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hping3 –flood -a xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx -2 -p #### xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx 
In the above format the xs represent IP addresses and the #s represent the port. 
The first IP address in the format is the spoof address that will display as the source 
address in the TCP/UDP dump. The port that will be used in this project is 6234 and the 
last IP address in the format will be the IP address of the target device.  Thus, the last 
IP address will either be 10.10.0.10 for Device A, or 10.10.0.11 for Device B (“DoS 
Attack,” n.d.). 
 The second attack is a TCP SYN flood DoS attack. The following is the format of 
the command that is used to execute the attack: 
hping3 xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx -q -n -d 120 -S -p ## --flood –rand-source 
In the above format the xs represent the targeted IP address, which once again 
will either be10.10.0.10 for Device A or 10.10.0.11 for Device B. Furthermore, -d 120 
represents that size of the packet being sent. The -S indicates that it is only sending 
SYN packets. The ## following the -p is the destination port. Lastly, the –flood –rand-
source means that it will flood the targeted device with the packets and the sources IP 
address will be randomly generated (“Denial-of-service,” 2015). 
 The third attack is an ICMP DoS attack. The format of the attack is as follows: 
hping3 xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx -q –icmp -C 3 -K 4 –faster 
In the above format the x’s once again resemble the IP address of the targeted 
address, being either 10.10.0.10 for Device A or 10.10.0.11 for Device B. This attack 
floods the targeted system with ICMP packets, which are coming from the source IP 
address of Device C, 10.10.0.13 (“Denial-of-service,” 2015). 
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Conclusion. Once Device A, Device B and Device C have been setup in 
VirtualBox and have been configured to a private internal network.  The setup 
configuration steps are completed on the Device B (Security Onion) machine. Lastly, 
Device C (Kali Linux) is utilized to launch different DoS attacks at Device A and Device 
B. The results of the attacks are then collected and analyzed to reveal the research 
findings.    
Data Collection 
While conducting this research project, the primary way in which data is collected 
is through the use of a snipping tool.  This allows the outputs of the experiment to be 
quickly gathered while the outputs are continuously evolving. Data is collected on 
numerous components of this research. The first is through the setup and configuration 
stages. In this part of the project, screenshots are taken to document the procedures 
used and the outcomes of those step, this would include: the configuration of the private 
network, identifying internal IP addresses through terminals, and the setup of the 
Security Onion machine. 
The second is through the launching of the attacks at Device A and Device B 
from Device C. Each of these attacks are launched and timed for 45 seconds before 
they are forcefully ended.  This creates a baseline in which all of the attacks can be 
compared by. If the attacks were to be launched for different amounts of time, the 
outputs, based on the number of packets transmitted and the impact on each machine, 
would vary significantly. Thus, each attack is conducted numerous times, on each 
machine, for a series of 45 seconds. The outputs of each of these attacks are then 
gathered. This would include the changes in the CPU processing power during the 
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length of the attack, in addition to the output of the packets being transmitted in a 
TCP/UDP dump.  
Lastly, the number of packets transmitted in each of the attacks is written down. 
This is done after each of the attacks have been executed and the results have been 
documented. Having this information provides another baseline, which can be used to 
compare the impact that each of these attacks have on Device A and Device B. After 
the collection of this data, it needs to be analyzed to draw any conclusions.  
Data Analysis 
 The analysis of the data is an important component of any experiment.  It takes 
the data brought in and turns it into information and results. For this work, the analysis 
of data starts with looking at each device separately, Device A and Device B. The 
attacks for each device are documented and need to be analyzed separately to 
understand the impact before they can be compared against one another. Each attack 
launched at a device is looked at on its own to understand the number of packets that 
were transmitted, the types packets transmitted, and the impact on the device’s CPU(s). 
Once this information is gathered, Device A and Device B can be compared. The same 
information can be cross examined in a comparative analysis to understand the 
similarities and differences discovered in the experiment.  
Summary 
The methodology chapter has covered several elements pertaining to the 
experiment conducted in this work. It explains the utilization of VirtualBox, and the 
configuration of the three virtual machines.  It addresses the concepts behind 
establishing an internal network to contain the attacks. It also includes the setup steps 
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of the Security Onion, to illustrate the configurations.  Lastly, it addresses the types of 





IV: Data Presentation and Analysis 
Introduction 
 This portion of the paper illustrates the data that is collected during the 
experiment. The data is presented in formal manner, after which it is analyzed to show 
the results of the experiment.  Conclusions will be drawn, and the outcomes of this 
research will be highlighted.  
Data Presentation 
 During the execution of this experiment, a significant amount of data was 
collected.  In order to break up the data and make it easier to understand, the 
presentation portion is split into two sections: the baseline data presentation and the 
security onion data presentation. 
Baseline Data Presentation 
 The baseline device in this project is referred to as Device A, which is configured 
with the Ubuntu operating system. Three DoS attacks are launched at the baseline 
device to show the impact that the attacks can have on a common, every day, device.  
The first attack launched is a UDP DoS attack, which is ejected by Device C.  Once 
again, device C is configure with the Kali Linux operating system. Figure 4.1 (below) 
shows the attack that was executed in Device C’s terminal. 
Figure 4.1. Device A UDP Attack 
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When the attack was launched at Device A, Device A’s terminal was open and 
was tracking the TCP/UDP traffic.  This is done by executing the command shown, 
below, in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2. Capture TCP Dump 
The type of traffic that was transmitted by the attack is shown in Device A’s 
TCP/UDP dump, which can be seen below in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3. Device A UDP TCP DUMP 
Figure 4.3 shows a small snippet of the numerous packets that were received by 
Device A during the attack. From the TCP/UDP dump, it is easy to conclude that the 
attack is a UDP dump, that is coming from the source IP address of 10.10.10.10 and is 
being received by destination IP address is 10.10.0.10.6234.  The packets are 




The UDP attack was conducted five different times to show any variations in the 
attack. Each time the packets collected by Device A were generally the same as the 
ones displayed above in Figure 4.3.  However, during the attack the CPU and network 
activity were monitored to show the impact on the device. Figure 4.4 (below), shows the 
CPU and network activity before any attack was generated.  
Figure 4.4 Device A CPU & Network Baseline UDP Attack 
Figure 4.4 is used as a baseline to indicate the performance of the machine, 
while operating in a normal state. Five UDP attacks were then launched at Device A.  
After each of the attacks the CPU and network activity were collected. Figure 4.5 




Figure 4.5. Device A UDP #1 
The remaining UDP attacks can be view in Appendix A. After each of the UDP 
attacks were launched for 45 seconds, the impact on the attacks were documented.  
However, once each of the attacks had been executed and terminated, after the 45 
second window, new information about the attack was revealed.  This information 
indicated the number of packets that were transmitted and received during the attack. 
The number of packets were then documented and placed in a bar chart to show the 





Figure 4.6. Device A UDP DoS Attack 
The next attack that was launched at the baseline machine was a TCP SYN flood 
Dos attack. The command used in Device C’s terminal to execute the attack can be 
seen below in Figure 4.7. 
Figure 4.7. Device A TCP SYN Flood Attack 
The packets received by Device A during the attack were viewed by looking at 


































Figure 4.8. Device A TCP SYN TCP Dump 
The packets shown in the TCP/UDP dump in Figure 4.8 are just a small portion 
of the numerous packets sent by Device C. From the dump it is evident that the sources 
destination isn’t set, as different IP addresses are shown.  Furthermore, the destination 
IP address is 10.10.0.10 and is set to HTTP or port 80. Lastly, the packet being sent is a 
SYN packet, which is continuously received by Device A without any responses being 
sent out. 
The TCP SYN Flood attack was conducted five different times to show the 
variations in the attack. Each time the packets collected by Device A were generally the 
same as the ones displayed above in Figure 4.8.  However, during the attack the CPU 
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and network activity were also monitored to show the impact on the device. Figure 4.9 
(below), shows the CPU and network activity before any attack was generated.  
Figure 4.9. Device A CPU & Network Baseline TCP SYN Attack 
Figure 4.9 is used as a baseline to indicate the performance of the machine, 
while operating in a normal state. Five TCP SYN flood attacks were then launched at 
Device A.  After each of the attacks the CPU and network activity were collected. Figure 
4.10 (below) illustrates the impact on Device A after the execution of the first attack. The 
rest of the TCP SYN flood attacks can be found in Appendix A. 
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Figure 4.10. Device A TCP SYN #1 
Once each of the TCP SYN Flood attacks had been launched, the results were 
documented in the above graphs. Although this wasn’t the only criteria that was 
examined. After each attack had been executed and then terminated, information about 
the attack was displayed in Device C’s terminal. This information included: the number 
of packets that were transmitted and received during the attack. The number of packets 
were then documented and placed in a bar chart to show the differences between each 
attack. This information can be seen below in Figure 4.11. 
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Figure 4.11. Device A TCP SYN DoS Attack 
 The last attack launched at the baseline device, from Device C, is the ICMP 
attack. The format of the attack, as shown in the Kali Linux terminal can be viewed 
below in Figure 4.12. 
Figure 4.12. Device A ICMP Attack 
Once again, the tcpdump command was used in Device A’s terminal to track the 
packets. After the attack was launched by Device C the packets displayed in the dump 































TCP SYN DoS Attack
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Figure 4.13. Device A TCP ICMP Dump 
Figure 4.13 shows a portion of the packets that are sent by Device C during the 
attack. From the TCP/ UDP dump it can be concluded that the source destination IP 
address is 10.10.0.13, which is the IP address of Device C.  In addition, the destination 
IP addresses is 10.10.0.10 and the packet being transmitted is ICMP 
 The ICMP attack was conducted five different times to show the variations in the 
attack. Each time the packets collected by Device A were generally the same as the 
ones displayed above in Figure 4.13.  However, during the attack the CPU and network 
activity were also monitored to show the impact on the device. Figure 4.14 (below), 
shows the CPU and network activity before any attack was generated.  
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Figure 4.14 Device A CPU & Network Baseline ICMP Attack 
Figure 4.14 is used as a baseline to indicate the performance of the machine, 
while operating in a normal state. Five TCP SYN flood attacks were then launched at 
Device A.  After each of the attacks the CPU and network activity were collected. Figure 
4.15 (below) illustrates the impact on Device A after the execution of the first attack. The 






Figure 4.15. Device A ICMP #1 
 After each of the attacks were launched the data on the CPU and network were 
documented.  However, once an attack was executed and then terminated, information 
was revealed in Device C’s terminal, pertaining to the number of packets that were 
transmitted.  These numbers were documented for each of the attacks and were then 
inputted into a bar chart to visually show the differences between the attacks.  This bar 
chart is displayed in Figure 4.16, which can be found below. Nevertheless, this 






Figure 4.16. Device A ICMP DoS Attack 
Security Onion Data Presentation 
 The next part of this section is the data presentation for the Security Onion.  It will 
be similar to the data presentation found in the baselines section, as the same attacks 
were launched at both devices. The Security Onion device in this project is referred to 
as Device B. The three DoS attacks that will be launched at Device B will once again be 
coming from Device C. Figure 4.17 (below) shows the first attack that was executed in 
Device C’s terminal. 

































When the attack was launched at Device B, Device B’s terminal was used to 
track the TCP/UDP packet traffic. The results from the attack, as shown in Device B’s 
terminal are depicted below in Figure 4.18. 
Figure 4.18. Device B UDP TCP Dump 
The UDP TCP dump displayed in Figure 4.18 shows a small portion of the 
numerous packets launched at Device B, from Device C.  From the TCP/UDP dump it is 
can be concluded that the sources destination is 10.10.10.10, which was assigned in 
the attack.  The destination IP is the securityonion and the port is 6234.  Moreover, it is 
a UDP packet that is sent over and over again to flood that system.  
 The UDP attack was launched five different times to illuminate the variations that 
can exist between the attacks. Each time the packets were collected in the TCP/UDP 
dump on Device B, they were similar to the output shown above in Figure 4.18. 
Although, this wasn’t the only component of interest.  The CPU and network activity 
were monitored to show the impact of each attack on the device. Figure 4.19 (below), 
shows the CPU and network activity before any attack was launched at the device.   
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Figure 4.19. Device B CPU & Network Baseline UDP Attack 
 The baseline illustrated in Figure 4.19 is used to compare the results gathered 
after each attack is launched. Each of the five UDP attacks will be launched separately.  
After each attack the CPU and network activity are documented. The results of the first 









Figure 4.20. Device B UDP #1 
After each of the UDP attacks were launched for a 45 second interval of time, the 
impact on the device was documented.  When the attack was terminated at the end of 
the 45 second mark, information on the attack was revealed in Device C’s terminal. The 
information of interest is the number of packets that are transmitted during the attack. 
The number of packets were then documented and placed in a bar chart.  This will help 





Figure 4.21. Device B UDP DoS Attack 
 The second attack that was launched at Device B’s machine was a TCP SYN 
flood DoS attack. The command used in Device C’s terminal to execute the attack is 
shown below in Figure 4.22.  
Figure 4.22. Device B TCP SYN Flood Attack 
The results from the attack can be viewed in Device B’s terminal, by executing 
the command to view the TCP/UDP dump.  This was previously addressed while 
looking at Device A’s results, with Figure 4.2. The packets captured during the attack 



































Figure 4.23. Device B TCP SYN TCP Dump 
 The packets depicted in the TCP/UDP dump in Figure 4.23 illustrate just a tiny 
portion of the many packets collected in the dump. However, from this TCP/UDP dump 
it is evident that the source’s IP address is continuously changing, as it is randomly 
generated. Thus, making it hard to identify where the packets are coming form. The  
destination IP address is 10.10.0.10 and is operating on a http port, or port 80.  In 
addition, the packet is a SYN packet which is send over and over again to flood the 
system and great a DoS.  
72 
 
 The TCP SYN Flood attack was conducted five different times to show the 
differences between the attacks.  Although each attack has the same kind of TCP/UDP 
dump shown above in Figure 4.23. This isn’t the only data collected during these 
attacks. The CPU and network activity were also monitored to show how the attacks 
impact the device. Figure 4.24 (below) illustrates the baseline collected for the CPU and 
network history.  Following Figure 4.24 is Figure 4.25, which illustrates the results 
documented during the first attack. The results collected on the remaining four attacks 
can be seen in Appendix B.  





 Figure 4.25. Device B TCP SYN Attack #1 
Once each of the TCP SYN Flood attacks had been launched, the results were 
documented in the above graphs. However, this wasn’t the only data that was collected 
during the experiments.  After each attack was launched and then terminated, 
information on the number of packets transmitted during the attack were collected. This 
information was then put into a bar chart to display the differences between each of the 
attacks. This bar chart is shown below as Figure 4.26.  This concludes the data 
presentation for the five TCP SYN Flood attacks that are launched at Device B from 





Figure 4.26. Device B TCP SYN DoS Attack 
The final attack launched at the Security Onion, or Device B, from Device C, is 
the ICMP attack. The command launched in the Kali Linux terminal to create this attack 
can be viewed in Figure 4.27. 
Figure 4.27. Device B ICMP Attack 
As previously stated, Device B’s terminal will be used to start a TCP/UDP dump.  
In which case the packets transmitted in the ICMP attack will appear in the dump.  The 
results of this dump can be viewed in Figure 4.28 (below). The TCP/UDP dump results 
































TCP SYN DoS Attack
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Figure 4.28. Device B TCP ICMP Dump 
From Figure 4.28 it is evident that the source IP address is 10.10.0.13, which is 
the actual IP address assigned to Device C. The destination IP address is then 
securityonion, which would translate to 10.10.0.11. Furthermore, the packet is an ICMP 
packets that is flooding the Device B’s system with an extreme number of packets. 
The ICMP attack was launched five separate times at Device B, from Device C. 
Each time the packets were displayed in the TCP/UDP dump and resembled the output 
displayed above in Figure 4.28. During the attack another piece of data was collected to 
be examined. This is referring to the CPU and network activity before and during an 
attack. Below, Figure 4.29 is used as a baseline, to show the machines state at a 
normal processing mode. After the baseline graph is the results of the first attack, 
shown in Figure 4.30 (below). The remaining attacks can be found in Appendix B. 
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Figure 4.31. Device B CPU & Network Baseline ICMP Attack 
Figure 4.32. Device B ICMP #1 
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 The ICMP attacks have all been launched and the data on the CPU and 
networking activity have been documented in the above graphs.  Moreover, once an 
attack is executed and then terminated after the 45 second window, more information is 
displayed in Device C’s terminal.  The information of interest pertains to the number of 
packets that are transmitted during an attack.  This information was record for all five of 
the attacks and were put into a bar chart to show the variations.  These results are 
available below in Figure 4.33.   
Figure 4.33. Device B ICMP Dos Attack 
This concludes the data presentation portion of the paper for both the baseline 



































The data presentation for the baseline machine, Device A, and the Security 
Onion machine, Device B, were displayed in the previous section as two separate 
pieces. In this section of the paper they will be compared against one another to show 
any similarities or differences that may arise. The three different attacks launched each 
of the machines will be examined, starting with the UDP DoS attack.  
The UDP DoS attack was the first attack launched at both of the devices. To 
understand the impact of each attack on a machine, the baselines need to be 
discussed.  For Device A the baseline CPU hovers around 40% fluctuating up into the 
50% range, on occasion. Its network is fluctuating up and down between the 0 to 
0.1Kib/s range. For Device B the baseline CPUs fluctuate between 0 and 40%, while 
the network runs between 0 and 0.2Kib/s. Just from comparing the two baselines, it 
becomes evident that Device A requires more CPU power, which can be contributed to 
the fact that it only has on CPU.  Meanwhile Device B uses less CPU power between 
the two of them.  
Furthermore, when looking at the five UDP attacks launched at Device A the 
CPU fluctuates from the 40% range up into the 60% range remaining there until the 
attack has stopped. The network activity varies depending on the attack.  For the first 
attack the network spikes to 1.6Mib/s and then even further to around 1.8Mib/s where it 
maintains until the attack is done.  For attack two and five it spikes to around 1.8Mib/s 
and maintains around that point.  For attack three and four, they both have spots where 
they run around 3.0Mib/s and 1.6Mibs.  
79 
 
When looking at the five UDP attacks launched at Device B, both CPUs fluctuate 
significantly with CPU1 working harder than CPU2.  CPU1 fluctuates between 40% to 
80%, while sometimes hitting 100%. CPU2 maintains between 40% and 60% during an 
attack. Device B’s network activity varies, depending on the attack. For attack one, two, 
three, and five the network maintains around 1.6Mib/s.  In attack four the network starts 
out around 1.6Mib/s and then fluctuates and increases to around 3.0Mib/s. From the 
first attack, the following can be concluded: Device B is better at maintaining the 
network activity, primary staying around 1.6Mib/s for each of the attacks. However, 
Device A maintains a better CPU processing.   
The next attack that was launched was the TCP SYN Flood DoS attack. The 
baselines were similar in all three cases, with the description above being applied to the 
last two cases as well. When looking at the five attacks on Device A, there were 
fluctuating results in both the CPUs and the network activities. For attack one and two 
the CPU maintained around 60% with random jumps up, nearing 100%.  In attack two 
the CPU was around 60% with a jump up to 90%. For attack four and five the CPU 
maintained around 60%. When looking at the network, in attack one it jumped to 
7.0Mib/s and then dropped and maintained around 4.8Mib/s. In attack two and four the 
network maintains around 4.8Mib/s. Lastly, in attack five and three the network 
maintained around 4.8Mib/s with a few jumps up around 7.0Mib/s and 8.0Mib/s. 
 The five attacks that were launched at Device B also had fluctuating results. The 
CPUs fluctuated primarily between 20% and 60%. In attack one, tree, and five the 
network jumped to 4.8Mib/s and maintained around there until the attack was finished. 
In attack two the network jumped to around 8.0Mib/sand then fell and maintained 
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around 5.0Mib/s. For the last attack, attack four, the network climbs to around 7.2Mib/s 
and then drops to around 5.0Mib/s. In the TCP SYN Flood attack Device B is more 
efficient at maintaining a lower CPU average compared to Device A. It is difficult to say 
which machine is better at maintaining the network activity as they both are jumping 
around and maintaining around the same levels. 
 The last attack that needs to be analyzed is the ICMP attack. When the five 
attacks were launched at Device A there were varying results. In attack one, three, and 
four the CPU operated in intervals of 60% and 100%. In attack two the CPU maintained 
around 60% and in attack five it was primarily around 60% with a random jump up into 
the 90% range. For the networks, attack one, three and four operated at intervals of 
0.0Mib/s and 1.8Mib/s. In attack two and five the network maintained around 1.8Mib/s 
 When looking at the impact that the five ICMP attacks had on Device B, it 
becomes evident that results fluctuate. In attack one and two the CPUs ranged between 
20% and 100%. Meanwhile, in attack three, four, and five the CPUs operated between 
40% and 100%.  Moving on to the network, in attack one the network started at 0.0Mib/s 
and jumped to 1.6Mib/s with a few drops.  In attack two the network activity showed 
intervals of 0.0Mib/s and 1.6Mib/s.  Finally, in attack three, four, and five, the network 
activity was around 1.6Mib/s. Once again, in this case Device B is primarily better at 
maintaining its CPU levels. It is also better at limiting the network activity remaining at a 
lower level than Device A.  
  Furthermore, it should be noted that the fluctuations in the different attacks can 
be contributed to the number of packets transmitted to the device, which was shown in 




 This section of the paper introduced the data presentation from the research. It 
broke it down into two categories: baseline data presentation and Security Onion data 
presentation.  After providing the presentation data, it was analyzed in the data analysis 






V: Discussion, Future Work, and Conclusion 
Introduction 
 This section of the paper aims to highlight the key points of the research, 
including complications and discussions. It will then outline future work for the project 
and conclude with remaining thoughts.  
Discussion 
This project was created to evaluate the efficiency of the Security Onion through 
a comparative analysis.  A baseline machine was created to serve as the other device 
in the comparative analysis. Three different DoS attacks were then projected at the 
machines to examine their ability handle the attacks. The TCP/UDP dumps, CPU and 
network activity were used as the evaluation criteria. After completing the research 
project several discussion points have been identified.   
 Frist, when looking at the results of the experiments Device B, or the Security 
Onion, is more efficient that the baseline machine. It is capable of maintaining a lower 
CPU for each of the CPUs, with it performing better in two of the three attacks.  
Moreover, it was also better at maintaining the network activity, once again performing 
better in two out of three attacks. The network activity can be contributed to the Firewall 
changes that are implemented in the setup of the Security Onion.  
 The second discussion point refers to the complications encountered during the 
experiment.  The Security Onion became a difficult tool to work with. The system kept 
reverting changes on its own and removing the set IP addresses. One minute the 
internal network would be working and the next it wouldn’t connect. During the 
experiment the network was setup in the GUI. After going through the setup, the IP 
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would reverted back, it was then set again through terminal commands. It would show in 
the terminal that it was configurated properly, however, when rebooting or refreshing the 
network the IP address would once again revert back to the original state.  
 The third discussion point is whether or not the Security Onion is a 
recommendable tool. With any system there are advantages and disadvantages. The 
Security Onion is equipped with a variety of tools that can be downloaded and used. 
However, a user requires a certain knowledge base. The users of the system have to be 
aware of different kinds of packet and should be able to read them.  If the user is 
capable of reading packets, then this tool could be useful in the right environment. It 
allows a user to sniff their network and categorized the types of packets.  Users can 
then setup an alert system to allow the system to run somewhat on its own.  It still 
requires continuous monitoring but introduces a level of efficiency.  
Future Work  
 Future work for this project would start with resolving the network complications.  
After the system is running smoothly, the same DoS attacks or other variations could be 
ran to examine the system’s ability to identify the attacks in the different tools and send 
an alert to the user. This was anticipated to be a portion of this project; however, the 
tools were only able to detect one ping test and then the IP addresses kept reverting 
back to the original format. Thus, making it impossible to conduct this portion of the 
project. In an attempt to include this in the work, several different Security Onion 
Machines were created to try and get the connection back. Nevertheless, each of the 




 In conclusion, the Security Onion is an efficient tool that could help professionals 
monitor their system.  It was more efficient at handing the different DoS attacks than the 
baseline Ubuntu machines was capable of doing. However, the Security Onion itself 
could use some updates and changes in its configurations. After some changes the tool 
could become a valuable tool for all companies, but a proper knowledge base is 
required to understand the configurations, the networks and the packets being 
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Appendix A: Device A’s Attack Results 








































































































Appendix B: Device B’s Attack Results 
 
Figure B.1. Device B UDP #2 
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Figure B.2. Device B UDP #3 
Figure B.3. Device B UDP #4 
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Figure B.4. Device B UDP #5 
Figure B.5. Device B TCP SYN Attack #2 
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Figure B.6. Device B TCP SYN Attack #3 
Figure B.7. Device B TCP SYN Attack #4 
105 
 
Figure B.8. Device B TCP SYN Attack #5 
Figure B.9. Device B ICMP #2 
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Figure B.10. Device B ICMP #3 
Figure B.11. Device B ICMP #4 
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Figure B.12. Device B ICMP #5 
 
